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GARBAGE CAN IN THE LABThorbjørn Knudsen, Massimo Warglien and
Sangyoon YiABSTRACT
We develop an experimental setting where the assumptions and
predictions of the garbage can model can be tested. A careful recon-
struction of the original simulation model let us select parameters that
leave room for potential variations in individual behavior. Our experi-
mental design replicates these parameters and thereby facilitates
comparison of human behavior with the original model. We ﬁnd that
the majority strategy of human subjects is consistent with the original
model, but exhibits some behavioral diversity. Human subjects exhibit
ﬂuid diverse behaviors that improve coordination in the face of
uncertainty, but hinder collective learning that can improve group
performance.INTRODUCTION
The ‘‘garbage can model’’ of organizational choice (Cohen, March, & Olsen,
1972) is an early agent-based formalization of the decision making process.
It formally describes how decision makers allocate their efforts to choice
opportunities that shift as a function of the way agents interact. As theThe Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice: Looking Forward at Forty
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THORBJØRN KNUDSEN ET AL.190actual interaction patterns are jointly determined by the organizational
structure and the behavioral propensities of the agents, the model provides
useful insights about the relationship between individual behavior and
organizational performance, given a particular organizational structure. In
this regard, the garbage can model presents an ideal case for experimental
investigation of the way individual behaviors jointly inﬂuence organiza-
tional choice and performance. As the model provides precise predictions
for a wide range of organizational structures, it lends itself to natural tests in
the laboratory.
What is more important, while the limelight has been concentrated on the
structural conditions that the model tries to capture and their effects on
decision making patterns, little attention has been devoted to the behavioral
assumptions embedded in the model – whether they are plausible, and
whether changes in choice heuristics would affect the conclusions of the
model itself. Will decision makers actually respond to the (shifting) demands
of choice opportunities in the way hypothesized by the model? In particular,
some of the conclusions of the garbage can model depend on the assumption
that all agents adopt the same behavioral rule – an assumption that appear
at odds with the ﬁndings from many experiments, that show a widespread
heterogeneity of individual behaviors (Camerer, 2003), and that suggest that
such heterogeneity may actually contribute to improve coordination among
agents (Rapoport, 1995). If diverse behaviors should appear in the garbage
can setting, what is their potential impact on organizational performance?
Are there ways to improve organizational decision making in garbage can
situations? Would subjects over time learn, and thereby improve organiza-
tional performance? Our aim is ﬁrst and foremost to address these open
questions and thereby provide an empirically grounded extension of the
original model. But it is also to explore if a laboratory test of the garbage
can model more generally may inspire experimental research that examines
the relationship between individual choice behavior and organizational
performance.
Experiments are certainly not new to organizational research – some
actually date back to the very origins of the ‘‘Carnegie Mellon’’ school. One
of the ﬁrst laboratory studies published in a management journal showed
that biased estimates and other anomalies at the microlevel are not neces-
sarily reﬂected at the macro level (Cyert, March, & Starbuck, 1961). Still,
organization science has until now seen relatively few attempts to bring
theories to the lab, challenge their assumptions, and test whether interactions
among individuals inﬂuence theory predictions at the organizational level.
Over the last ﬁve decades, about 50 laboratory studies were published in the
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Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly,Management Science, andOrgani-
zation Science).1 However, most of these studies tested behavior at the
individual or unstructured group level but rarely the organizational level of
analysis. We believe it is time to move to the next level, and therefore aim to
submit a theory at the organizational level to a test in the laboratory.
In this chapter, we develop a laboratory setting in which the predictions of
the garbage can model can be experimentally tested. A careful reconstruc-
tion of the original simulation model enables us to select a set of structural
parameters that leave room for potential variations in individual behavior.
We then set up a laboratory experiment that replicates these parameters
and thereby allows us to compare human behavior with the predictions from
the original simulation model. Do human agents exhibit the same patterns
of collective decision making as the computational agents? Do human
agents solve more problems than the computational agents? On the ground
of the observed results, we extend the original model, explore alternative
behavioral hypotheses, and check their implications for organizational
performance in garbage can settings.THE ORIGINAL GARAGE CAN MODEL AND
ITS USE IN A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
The garbage can model is a true organizational classic, but despite being
widely cited, it has rarely been challenged on empirical grounds. It has even
been suggested that the model ‘‘has led a charmed life-to its disadvantage’’
(Bendor, Moe, & Shotts, 2001, p. 169). Indeed, a veil of confusion has often
surrounded debates about the garbage can model, and both critics and
supporters have often ended up seeing, in the brilliant metaphor of
organizational decision making, the image of what they wanted to ﬁnd – a
veritable Rorschach test for social scientists.
A preliminary distinction between the broader theory of choice in
‘‘organized anarchies’’ and the model stricto sensu is helpful (Bendor et al.,
2001). The broader theory is set in qualitative terms, and characterized by
the idea that the ordinary ‘‘consequentialist’’ structure of decision making
(both in the rational and bounded rationality views) has to be relaxed in
favor of a more ﬂuid one: An organization is ‘‘ya collection of choices
looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in
which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might
THORBJØRN KNUDSEN ET AL.192be the answery’’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 1). In the tradition of bounded
rationality, decision making is equated with problem solving, but the usual
goal-driven sequence of problem solving is subverted in favor of a ﬂow where
all elements stand on equal footing and affect each other in a nonhierarchical
way: ‘‘y one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which
various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they
are generated. The mix of garbage in a single can depends on the mix of cans
available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is
currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected
and removed from the scene.’’ (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 2). The qualitative
theory that has grown from the garbage can metaphor has been very
inﬂuential in establishing a nonconsequentialist view of decision making
(March & Olsen, 1984, 1989), and has provided an interpretive framework
for numerous ﬁeld studies. However, its very qualitative, verbal nature
makes it compatible with a very broad range of behavioral assumptions and
thereby limits its predictive power. On the other hand, the computer model
that lies at the core of Cohen et al.’s (1972) original paper makes predictions
about the outcomes of organizational decisions, given rather precise
assumptions about individual behavior and a set of well-deﬁned structural
constraints. While it can only be taken as an instance or illustration of the
broader framework of ‘‘organized anarchies,’’ it provides an ideal back-
ground for experimental explorations. A closer look at the model will allow
us to clarify the main issues of experimental inquiry and motivate our
experimental design.A Dynamic Coordination Problem
At its core, the garbage can computer model can be described as an instance
of a coordinated effort allocation problem. As is well known, the basic
elements of the model are decision makers, endowed with some capability to
supply effort that will help solve problems (energy supply), problems that
require effort to be solved, and ‘‘choice opportunities’’ (garbage cans) that
deﬁne arenas where agents and problems meet. In each period during the
process, decision makers allocate their effort among competing choice
opportunities, and the coordination of their joint effort allows problem
solving. Just like individuals are endowed with capabilities to supply effort,
problems carry energy (effort) requirements. The basic principle is that a
problem can be solved only when the (cumulative) energy spent on it exceeds
its energy requirement. However, problems don’t get solved in insulation.
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problems in a choice opportunity (in a can) can be matched by the effort
spent on the same choice opportunity. In that case, the choice opportunity is
removed from the scene together with the problems attached to it. Thus, in
Fig. 1, the can (a) will be removed and problems 1, 2, and 5 will be solved,
while problems 3 and 4 will persist, as will can (b). The outcome is that one
problem is solved by expenditure of the required amount of energy.
Thus, the garbage can model could be reinterpreted as a dynamic
coordination game, in which multiple agents with no conﬂict of interests
have to choose moves that jointly contribute to solving as many problems as
possible. Since there are multiple ways in which agents may combine their
actions to achieve that goal, each agent is exposed to a great amount of
uncertainty about which actions to choose. This feature of the garbage can
model is no different from static coordination games, where the agent’s
choice set not only depends on her own actions but also on the action of
others. The added ingredient that sets the garbage can model apart, and in
our view makes it a dynamic coordination game, is that the strategy sets
change dynamically as a function of the agents’ actions and the way
problems move. It is therefore highly challenging for each agent to preﬁgure
what the current relevant strategies are, to assess what the other agents
preﬁgure, and how to pick a successful action given this uncertainty.
Thus, at least two features make the garbage can model very different
from the kind of games that have received large attention both in game
theory and experimental economics (Kagel & Roth, 1995). First, it is a
genuinely dynamic coordination game, where choices at time t are affectedFig. 1. Illustration of Problem Solving in the Garbage Can Model.
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intertemporal dependence is a deﬁning feature of the garbage can model. It
is present because effort is cumulative (once exerted, it transfers across
periods) and because the choice opportunities available at any period, as
well as the distribution of problems among available choices, depends on the
agents’ past behavior. Second, it is (to use a favorite adjective from Cohen
et al., 1972) a ‘‘ﬂuid’’ game where problems and choices enter the choice
arena in unpredictable ways – trying to solve the game by backward
induction would be a remarkably frustrating effort!Organizational Structure
The ﬂuidity of the coordination problem is shaped by some structural
factors that give the garbage can model a peculiar organizational ﬂavor. In
particular, both the agents’ and the problems’ access to choice opportunities
are constrained by organizational arrangements that deﬁne which agents
(or which problems) can be attached to a given choice opportunity. Three
types of structure are considered: ‘‘unsegmented’’ (Fig. 2a), ‘‘hierarchical’’
(Fig. 2b), and ‘‘specialized’’ (Fig. 2c). The same type of structure can apply
to both decision makers and problems.
Finally, two additional sets of parameters affect the model behavior:
(1) the sequential entry order of decision makers, choice opportunities, and
problems and (2) the energy load (how the energy requirement of the
problems relate to the energy capacity of decision makers).Fig. 2. The Deﬁnition of Access Structure in the Garbage Can Model.
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While the ‘‘verbal’’ theory of organized anarchies makes very loose
assumptions about the behavior of the agents (preferences are ill-deﬁned
and possibly inconsistent, and discovered through action), the garbage can
computer model makes simple and homogeneous assumptions about agent
behavior. The agents are all assumed to follow the same rule of behavior,
which can be stated as ‘‘allocate your effort to the (available) choice
opportunity where the problems appear closest to solution’’ (or, in the
language of the model, where the energy deﬁcit is lowest). Clearly, this
decision rule can be labeled as a simple decision making heuristic. The
decision rule is not really motivated in the original garbage can paper, but
can plausibly be associated with the idea of myopic adaptive behavior (look
at the closest solution, ignore the future, and the intentions of the others), an
idea that has a long tradition in adaptive models of organizational choice in
the behavioral tradition. Remarkably enough, this is the same rule that
problems follow in migrating from one choice opportunity to the other. The
fact that problems have a degree of agency symmetric to that of decision
makers is one of the most peculiar and intriguing aspects of the garbage can
theory – but one on which we will not elaborate in this chapter.Patterns of Decision Making
The garbage canmodel occupies a place of its own in the literature on decision
making, not only because of its accent on dynamic, ﬂuid coordination
problems, but also for its peculiar characterization of the outcomes of
organizational choice processes, which are described not only in terms of
effectiveness and efﬁciency (how many problems get solved, with how much
energy waste) but also in terms of patterns of choice – the decision making
styles that emerge as the result of the interactions among decision makers
and problems. Cohen et al. (1972) distinguish three characteristic patterns.
The ﬁrst pattern is the most traditional pattern of choice and problem
solving: after working on a choice opportunity (a) for some time, the choice
is made (t¼ 2), and both problems and the can disappear (t¼ 3). As
illustrated, this happens because the joint effort allocated to the problems in
the can (gray) meets the requirement in that arena (white). This pattern is
labeled as decision making by resolution (Fig. 3).
The second pattern emerges when (some) decision makers deal with
choice opportunities that are devoid of problems (because these are attached
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the choice opportunity from the stage, but will solve no problems (Fig. 4).
This is referred to as decision making by oversight.
The third pattern is favored by the migration of problems to another
choice opportunity, which reduces the energy demand associated with the
‘‘old’’ choice. This process captures the idea that choice opportunities are
solved by diminishing requirements instead of increasing efforts. This
pattern is appropriately labeled as decision making by ﬂight (Fig. 5).2
One of the main results of the garbage can model is to show that non-
resolution patterns of choice emerge and may constitute a signiﬁcant
portion of the overall decision output of an organization – and to show howFig. 3. Decision Making by Resolution in the Garbage Can Model.
Fig. 4. Decision Making by Oversight in the Garbage Can Model.
Fig. 5. Decision Making by Flight in the Garbage Can Model.
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organization.
Summary of Results from the Original Model
The original garbage can model provides three sets of notable results. First,
decision making by ﬂight and oversight is quite common – that is, decisions
are made that do not solve any problems. The model generally suggests that
resolution of problems is not the most common style of decision making.
Rather, decision making by ﬂight and oversight appears to be a major feature
of the process of organizational choice. Second, higher problem difﬁculty
(energy load) tends to increase problem activity, decision maker activity,
decision difﬁculty, and the uses of ﬂight and oversight. Third, the effect of
alternative organization structures is characterized in terms of critical trade-
offs. Speciﬁcally, three aspects of the decision processes deﬁne trade-offs
that contribute to the overall efﬁciency of the organization: problem acti-
vity, problem latency, and decision time. Segmentation of the access
structure tends to reduce the number of unresolved problems active in the
organization, but at the cost of increasing the latency period of problems
and, in most cases, the time devoted to reaching decisions. On the other hand,
segmentation of the decision structure tends to result in decreasing problem
latency, but at the cost of increasing problem activity and decision time.
These results imply a fundamental trade-off that organization designers face
in balancing different aspects of decision making efﬁciency. Especially, the
issue of problem latency becomes important in situations where overlooked
problems can seriously damage organizational performance. Another
notable result is the tendency of decision makers and problems to track
each other through choices. This result is consistent with the observation that
decision makers might have a feeling that they are always working on the
same problems in somewhat different contexts, mostly without results.
THE EXPERIMENTAL GARBAGE CAN AND THE
SIMULATION BENCHMARK RESULTS
The garbage can model offers a set of distinct predictions about the choice
patterns that would emerge from alternative structural constraints.
Unfortunately, the space of parameters of the original simulations is too
large for any realistic experimental design. The combinations of access
structures for both decision makers and problems, their possible orders of
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to organize a laboratory experiment on such a scale. Furthermore, it might
not be particularly fruitful. For example, a specialized access structure, in
the sense of the original simulation model, is an extreme that leaves little
room for discretionary action of decision makers, since each agent is assigned
to a speciﬁc choice opportunity (and so is each problem). Thus, in such
case little or nothing could be added by an experiment to what is already
shown by a computer simulation. Thus, we had to choose a set of parameters
that is directly comparable to the ones in the original simulation model, but
at the same time provide enough interesting alternatives to human subjects
and nontrivial problem migrations among choice opportunities.Choice of Access Structures
In the interest of examining human behavior in the context of dynamic
coordination, we decided to explore the unsegmented access structure for
decision makers (all subjects can act on all cans). This access structure
allows interesting variation in individual behavior and also maximizes the
challenge associated with achieving a coordinated outcome at the
organizational level. As regards the access structure for problems, we were
also motivated by our desire to maximize the challenge of achieving
coordination at the organizational level. To capture this challenge, we used
a hierarchical structure, which induces differential patterns in the way
problems move across cans (since each problem has different constraints).
This feature makes problem behavior hard to predict. Under the
unsegmented structure, all problems would systematically mass-migrate to
the can closest to solution, making problem behavior very predictable.Downscaling the Model
The original model was downscaled to facilitate the implementation of the
garbage can model in the laboratory.3 Speciﬁcally, we deﬁned an organi-
zation that has four decision makers and faces eight choice opportunities
and 16 problems sequentially. An experimental run consists of 10 periods
(against the original 20 periods), and in each of the ﬁrst 8 periods one choice
opportunity and two problems arrive at the organization. Each group of
experimental decision makers participates in 10 consecutive runs.
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of choice opportunities and problems. This was done to make it easier for
subjects to learn, and for us to analyze if any learning was happening. We
used the following two random entry sequences: {3, 5, 8, 2, 4, 6, 1, 7} for
choice opportunities and {6, 4, 5, 12, 14, 2, 13, 10, 1, 3, 9, 11, 8, 16, 7, 15} for
problems.The Docking Problem
To get benchmark predictions that are directly comparable with the
experimental results, we reconstructed the original computer model and ran
it under the parameters of the experiment. Below, we brieﬂy discuss the
considerable difﬁculties that we met, and overcame, during our engagement
with this reconstruction effort – a challenge that among aﬁcionados is
known as ‘‘the garbage can docking problem.’’ Having obtained a reliable
and almost perfect replica of the original model,4 we could verify that the
experimental version of the model predicted outcomes qualitatively similar
to those obtained from using the original parameters (see Table 1).
Furthermore, simulations conﬁrmed that during each round there would be
enough alternative choice opportunities available to decision makers – thus,
the behavioral assumptions of the model could be tested in the lab.Benchmark Results
Table 1 summarizes the simulation results for the ‘‘downscaled model’’
obtained by averaging over random entry sequences exactly as in the
original model. All parameters are identical to those that we have used in the
experiment.Table 1. Simulation Results from the Simpliﬁed Garbage Can Model.
Least Energy Deﬁcit
Mean SD Range
Problems solved 2.64 1.00 2–6
Choices made 5.82 0.45 5–7
Proportion of choices by ﬂight/oversight 0.60 0.07 0.43–0.67
Mean problem activity 5.61 0.04 5.50–5.63
Mean can lifetime 3.74 0.12 3.50–3.88
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In order to keep the experimental design manageable in the laboratory, we
used the downscaled version of the model described in the previous section.
The experiment was performed in a computerized lab where subjects could
interact with a computer interface representing concurrent information on
(1) available choice opportunities, (2) effort required to achieve resolution
for each can (energy demand), (3) collective effort allocated to each can after
the last period, and (4) the cumulative performance of the group of decision
makers, measured in terms of the number of problems solved. Fig. 6 shows a
snapshot of the interface (see Appendices A–C for a detailed description of
the instructions). There are eight boxes on the screen, each of whichFig. 6. A Snapshot of What the Subjects See on Their Computer Monitor.
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opportunity, while a gray box indicates latent opportunities that have not
yet arrived. A black box represents a decision that has already been made –
it is therefore not active anymore.
The height of the dotted bar shows how much effort is needed to solve the
associated problems, that is, the sum of their required energy. The striped
bar indicates the amount of accumulated energy devoted by the participants
so far. Once the striped bar becomes as high as, or taller than, the dotted
bar, the decision is made by solving the associated problems. A choice can
also be made in a can if all the associated problems move to other active
choice opportunities and the height of the dotted bar falls to zero (i.e., no
dotted bar), while some effort has been accumulated in the same can –
decision making by ﬂight.
The players’ decisions and feedback on the decision outcomes were
aggregated and synchronized in each discrete period through the local
network. For each discrete period, feedback on choice outcomes would only
appear after all decision makers had made their choices. As in the original
model, subjects had a ﬁxed amount of energy to spend in each period, and this
energy couldbe allocated to only one choice opportunity at a time (by selecting
the appropriate can number on the computer keyboard). To allow subjects
to become familiar with the task, the entry sequences of problems and
cans were the same in all 10 rounds (as described in the previous section).5
Subjects received a ﬁxed monetary reward for their participation plus a
variable reward proportional to the group performance in terms of number
of problems solved (thus there were no conﬂicting incentives). We report
results from a total of 16 experiments (for a total of 64 subjects) that were
run in the laboratories of the University of Southern Denmark, Odense, and
Universita` Ca’ Foscari, Venezia, during the fall of 2011. No signiﬁcant
differences in the two subject pools were observed, so we treated them as a
unique subject pool. Prior to the experimental runs, we tested and calibrated
the computer interface and the effectiveness of the instructions in three pilot
studies that were conducted in the spring of 2011.RESULTS FROM THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
Problem Solving Patterns
Table 2 provides a summary of the aggregate results that were extracted
from all of the 16 experimental groups. The problem solving capabilities of
Table 2. Aggregate Results from Human Subjects in the Laboratory.
Human Subjects
Mean SD Range
Problems solved 2.98 1.49 0–13
Choices made 6.31 0.56 5–7
Proportion ﬂight/oversight 0.62 0.13 0–1
Mean problem activity 5.58 0.59 2.7–6.5
Mean can lifetime 2.71
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original computer model. At the end of the ten experimental runs, groups had
on average solved 2.98 out of the16 problems that were introduced during
each run. The standard deviation of problems solved was 1.49 and the range
within aminimum of 0 and an impressive maximum of 13 solved problems. In
the ‘‘downsized’’ computer model (Table 1), the average number of problems
solved was 2.64 (within a range of 2–6 problems solved).
On average, 6.31 out of 8 choices were made, but resolution of problems
was not the most common style for making decisions. Rather, decision
making by ﬂight and oversight accounted for 62% of the choices (against
60% of the computer model!). Interestingly, the decision style varied across
trials, with extremes spanning the entire range of problem activity, with
ﬂight and oversight accounting for 0–100% of all choices that were made in
a trial. The mean problem activity was 5.58 (number of periods a problem
was active and attached to some choice), and the can lifetime was 2.71
(number of periods a choice arena was active).
To summarize, the human subjects performed fairly similarly to the
computer version of the garbage can model. T-tests on the difference in
means between the experimental results and the computer simulations show
that the humans solve slightly more problems (p¼ 0.037), make notably
more choices (po0.001), and have a lower can lifetime (po0.001). However,
there is no difference as regards the proportion of choices made by ﬂight and
oversight (p¼ 0.447) or the mean problem activity (p¼ 0.462).
Interestingly, learning at the group level across the 10 rounds does not
seem to account much for differences in performance across groups. In fact,
there is no learning appearing from the aggregate data, nor do the best
performing groups appear to learn more than the worst performing ones.
Fig. 7 shows evidence on experiential learning across trials in terms of
problems solved averaged across all groups. The hypothesis that there is a
Fig. 7. Test of Experiential Learning in the Garbage Can.
(R2¼ 0.0322, p¼ 0.62.)
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vidual groups does not reveal any differences in this pattern across groups.Individual Behavior
While the predictions of the garbage can model appear to be fairly
successful, we have yet to examine individual behavior and whether it
conforms to the assumptions of the garbage can model. As recalled above,
the fundamental assumption of the model about individual behavior is that
decision makers look for the choice opportunities where the energy deﬁcit is
lowest. Is this the strategy human subjects employ in the experiment? Of
course, we have to restrict our analyses to the periods in which agents had at
least two cans available, so that it is possible to discriminate among
alternative behaviors. We have coded three behavioral strategies that apply
to such cases. The ﬁrst one, labeled ‘‘garbagecanness,’’ corresponds to the
application of the behavioral rule from the original model: look for the can
THORBJØRN KNUDSEN ET AL.204with the lowest energy deﬁcit. The second measure is the mirror of
garbagecanness: look for the can with the highest energy deﬁcit. We labeled
this measure ‘‘optimism.’’ Finally, we deﬁned a ‘‘residual’’ category that
captures any other moves than seeking cans with least energy deﬁcit
(garbagecanness) and cans with maximal energy deﬁcit (optimism).
Table 3 summarizes the distribution of strategies among experimental
subjects. It shows that garbagecanness is indeed the modal behavior, but
accounts for only 57%of the choices. Thus, there ismuch room for behavioral
diversity in individuals and groups. This result points to an interesting
difference between human subjects and computer agents.
A natural question thus arises. If similar patterns of choice appear in
the presence of differences in individual decision making behavior, is the
result just driven by the structure of the choice problem, independently of
what individuals do? In other words, to what extent can individual behavior
affect the outcome of the decision process? The higher performance variance
in human groups versus the computer model hints at the possibility that
individual behaviors, and their distribution in groups, could matter.
However, there are no clear patterns in the experimental observations that
enable detection of factors associated with differential performance among
the groups. As observed above, learning effects are negligible, and
uncorrelated to group success. The relative incidence of ‘‘non-garbagecan-
ness’’ is also uncorrelated to group success. So is success in facing the
challenge of the garbage can just the result of chance?
While the experimental data provide no clear answer, the computer
simulations can inform this question. Stimulated by the evidence of
heterogeneity in individual behavior, we ran a version of the simulation
model in which behavior was entirely random. Remarkably, if the behavior
of the computer agents is simple randomization of choices, performance
increases dramatically! (Table 4).Table 3. Individual Choice Strategies.
Mean
Garbagecanness 0.57
Optimism 0.34
Other choices 0.09
Entropy 0.54
Random benchmark 0.48
Table 4. Comparison of Human Subjects and Computer Agents with
Different Behavioral Propensities.
Mean
Experiment Original Model Random Behavior
Problems solved 2.98 2.64 6.04
Choices made 6.31 5.82 6.78
Proportion ﬂight/oversight 0.62 0.60 0.42
Mean problem activity 5.58 5.61 4.85
Mean can lifetime 2.71 3.74 3.39
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behavioral patterns in the laboratory observations cannot be reconciled
with random behavior. Rather, the laboratory experiments indicated
behavioral diversity within groups, as if individuals would adopt particular
roles associated with garbagecanness (‘‘always make the easy choices’’) or
optimism (‘‘always make the difﬁcult choices’’).
We therefore ran the garbage can simulation model with different
mixtures of garbagecanness and optimism. The result is reported in Fig. 8. It
is easy to see that the mean problem solving performance increases in the
number of agents that are ambitious (optimists). This is because the version
of the model we used in the laboratory presents the human subjects with
difﬁcult problems, in the sense that the energy requirement is high. The
results from the experiment cannot be predicted by any of the computer
simulations shown in Fig. 8. However, an average across the four
simulations comes remarkably close to the observed results, including the
score of 2.98 problems solved.
The main difference that remains to be explained is the higher variance in
performance of experimental groups. Since the entropy (related to decision)
of the groups appears unrelated to performance, it is likely that this effect
can be attributed to the intertemporal sequence of choices that is not
captured by our averages. Postexperiment interviews with groups of subjects
revealed that the adaptive behavior of unsuccessful subjects produced
signals that confused the other players, an effect that resulted in
unproductive cascades of failed mutual adaptation. In conclusion, the basis
for successful human engagement with the kind of problems that are
enshrined in the garbage can model is a stable division of strategies among
decision makers who exhibit a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity in
behavior in terms of the energy deﬁcit of the choices that are pursued.
Number of Optimists
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Fig. 8. Computer Simulation of Agents with Heterogeneous Behavior.
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This experimental study, in conjunction with simulation analysis, was
motivated by the fact that the garbage can model, despite its notable impact
on the literature, has rarely been challenged on empirical grounds. We
produced a reliable and almost perfect replica of the original computer
model. We then used this clean version of the simulation model to construct
the experimental environment in the laboratory and to generate predictions
that could serve as a benchmark for the experimental results.
The analysis revealed a number of interesting results. First, we found that
individual subjects systematically played strategies that are consistent with
the behavioral assumptions made in the original model. Consequently, the
human subjects performed fairly similar to the computer version of the
garbage can model. This is a notable success story for the underlying theory.
Second, we observed that human subjects did not uniformly adopt the
rule of pursuing least energy deﬁcit (i.e., easy choice opportunities) that was
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followed strategies that preserved a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity in
behavior (e.g., pursuing difﬁcult choice or switching between easy and
difﬁcult choices). The effect of the observed behavioral diversity was that
groups of human decision makers outperformed the garbage can simulation.
This result implies that behavioral diversity (or, different preferences) may
be an important factor of successful performance in dynamic coordination
contexts. Differences in choice behavior serve as a capacity to ﬂexibly cope
with unpredictable arrivals of decision opportunities and associated
problems. If the nature of future choice situations can be predicted, and if
desirable behaviors are known ex ante, it would be possible to design
effective incentive systems that could solve coordination problems. The
reality, however, often deviates from this ideal situation. In a context
characterized by an unpredictable environment and imperfect control of
individual behaviors (i.e., ﬂuidity in the garbage can model), behavioral
diversity is a source of ﬂexibility that promotes successful coordination.
We know from prior work in complexity theory that diversity can be
beneﬁcial for group performance. For instance, Scott Page (2007) showed
how diversity could reduce collective error by improving the estimate of the
expected value of some observation. While this idea explains why crowds
may outperform individuals in a static environment, it does not explain why
diversity can also be beneﬁcial in a dynamic context characterized by
uncertainty, mutual adaptation, and intertemporal path dependence.
Minority games, like the famous El Farol Bar problem (Arthur, 1994),
are more illuminating. In this problem, the chance of success of a strategy
decreases with the number of agents adopting it, which in turn forces the
agents to form divergent expectations and follow diverse behaviors. This
idea is closely related to the emergence of diverse behaviors in our
laboratory experiment. Indeed, the garbage can model can be thought of as
a variant of the El Farol Bar problem, with the added complication that
bars open and close at unpredictable hours.
Third, quite surprisingly the experiments showed no clear indication of
learning at the aggregate level. Apparently, the garbage can setting derailed
attempts to systematically enhance group performance through individual
learning. Through interviews with the subjects, we found that the likely
reason for the no-learning result was that subjects often confused each
other. Just as heterogeneity in behaviors could increase performance,
frustrating performance may induce changes in choices and increase
behavioral heterogeneity. Thus, heterogeneity in behavior could be both
the source and the consequence of performance.
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has both theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically, collective
learning may not be compatible with dynamic coordination. Success in
dynamic coordination is associated with a ﬂuid context as it demands
freedom to make simultaneous changes in individual choices. By contrast,
success in individual learning requires a stable context where learning by
someone could be ‘‘substituted’’ with learning by others (Levinthal &
March, 1993). It is likely that these two demands are not always compatible.
Further investigation into the conditions in which dynamic coordination
and collective learning could complement each other will be a promising
research topic.
Empirically, our results suggest that observed behavioral heterogeneity
could be both a determinant and a consequence of performance. Disen-
tangling cause and effect would require a quantiﬁcation of the partial amount
of behavioral heterogeneity that can be attributed to performance feedback.
We suggest that future laboratory studies of interactive human behavior
and group performance should be designed in a way that allows such
decomposition.
In conclusion, we are impressed by the predictive performance of the
simple behavioral theory that undergirds the garbage can model, and we are
excited about the prospects of advancing an experimental organization
science that submits organizational level phenomena to rigorous tests in the
laboratory.NOTES
1. Based on a simple JSTOR-search on these journals, conducted on February 12,
2012. Our search included any article with the term ‘‘laboratory experiment’’ in the
abstract.
2. This ﬁgure actually shows a choice involving both ﬂight and resolution – the
ﬂight of some problems diminishes the energy demand so that the remaining problem
can be solved (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 8). In the extreme case of decision making by
ﬂight, all problems leave the choice opportunity and the decision solves no problems.
3. A simpliﬁed version of the garbage can model is used to reliably extract
behavioral patterns from laboratory subjects. As the arrival rate of choice
opportunities (one per period) and problems (two per period) are held identical to
the original model, however, the situation (i.e., available choice opportunities and
associated problems) from the perspective of an individual decision maker is
equivalent to that of the original model. Note that a decision maker should make her
choice without knowledge of others’ choices, and hence the number of decision
makers has little impact on the decision process at the individual level and the
qualitative results at the organization level.
Garbage Can in the Lab 2094. Perfection is measured by minimal deviation from the original model on vital
statistics such as rate of problem resolution, mean problem activity, and proportion
of choices by ﬂight and oversight.
5. The software used for the experiments is available on request. It has been
written in Processing, a dialect of the Java language.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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THORBJØRN KNUDSEN ET AL.210APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
Together with three other persons, you are going to participate in an
experiment on decision making.
There will be 10 blocks of 10 rounds. At each round you will see 8 boxes
on the screen. Each of these boxes represents a ‘‘task.’’ Tasks can be active
or inactive. Active tasks are indicated with a white color. Gray rectangles
are the tasks that have not yet become active. Black tasks are ‘‘gone’’ – they
are no longer active.
Within each task, there can be dotted bars and striped bars. Dotted bars
show how much effort is needed to solve the problems currently attached to
the task. Striped bars show how much (cumulative) effort has been spent by
you and by the others to try to fulﬁll this particular task.
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your ‘‘effort’’ to help solving problems. For each round, you have a ﬁxed
amount of effort, which can be allocated to just one task in each round. To
make a decision, you must press a key with the number corresponding to the
task you are choosing. If you choose a task that is not active (i.e., which
corresponds to a gray or black rectangle), your effort will be wasted.
You can decide when there is a green light on your screen. When there is a
red light, you have to wait – others still have to make their own decision!
A task is fulﬁlled when the amount of cumulative effort (the striped bar) is
at least as high as the dotted bar. When a task is fulﬁlled, it becomes black
and is no longer active. Also, problems attached to a fulﬁlled task will
disappear. However, problems may move from task to task, so the height of
the dotted bar could change over time. Thus, you might ﬁnd that there are
no more problems attached to a task you have been working on!
The screen will report how many problems have been solved up to that
moment.
Your goal as a group is to solve as many problems as possible. The
number of problems solved will determine the probability to win 14 euros.
The probability to win will be given by the number of problems you solved
divided by 160 (which is the max).
You will also be rewarded with a ﬁx amount of 7 euros for your
participation.
Thank you for your participation!
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DOWNSCALED GCM FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Attributes and Actions of AgentsAgents Attributes ActionsDecision Maker Choice Opportunity: The
choice opportunity
currently participating
in, if any
Available Energy:
Available energy per
periodSearch: Find the choice
opportunity with least
energy deﬁcit (excluding
the contribution of her
energy) among available
ones
Move: Participate in the
found choice
opportunity and update
the Choice Opportunity.Decision Problem Choice Opportunity: The
choice opportunity
currently attached to, if
any
Required Energy: Required
energy for resolutionSearch: Find the choice
opportunity with least
energy deﬁcit (excluding
the contribution of its
energy) among available
ones
Move: Attach itself to the
found choice
opportunity and update
the Choice Opportunity.
Solve: Remove itself from
the Attached Problems
of its Choice
Opportunity and the
Decision Problems of
the Organization.Choice
OpportunityAttached Problems:
Currently attached
decision problemsUpdate: Update the energy
deﬁcit based on
currently Attached
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participating decision
makers
Energy Deﬁcit: Sum of the
required energy by the
attached problems
minus the cumulative
sum of the devoted
energy by current and
previous participantsProblems and
Participants.
Make: If having any
attached problem, count
as a ‘‘decision by
resolution’’ and let Solve
the Attached Problems;
otherwise, count as a
‘‘decision by ﬂight/
oversight.’’ Remove
itself from the Choice
Opportunities of the
Organization.Organization Decision Makers: A ﬁxed
number of decision
makers
Decision Problems:
Problems that came into
the organization but not
solved yet
Choice Opportunities:
Choice opportunities
that came into the
organization but not
made yet
Access Structure: Mapping
decision problems to
accessible choice
opportunities
Decision Structure:
Mapping decision
makers to accessible
choice opportunitiesAllocate
1st step: Each of the
Decision Problems and
Decision Makers does
Search.
2nd step: Each of the
Decision Problems and
Decision Makers does
Move.
Make Choices: Each of the
Choice Opportunities
does Update its energy
deﬁcit, and Make if its
new energy deﬁcit is
equals to or below zero.Model Procedure
Initialization
Create an organization with four decision makers and set the organizational
structure (access structure, decision structure).
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required energy for a decision problem, and the entry sequence of the 16
problems and 8 choice opportunities.Repetition (for 10 time periods)
At each time period, create a decision problem of the next kind according to
the entry sequence, assign it the predeﬁned required energy, and let it come
into the organization and add itself to the set of decision problems.
At each second time, create a choice opportunity of the next kind
according to the entry sequence, assign it an energy deﬁcit of zero, and let it
come into the organization and add itself to the set of choice opportunities.
The organization does allocate the decision problems and the decision
makers within its boundary and make choices.Finalization
Update model statistics: Problems solved, choices made, decisions by
resolution, decisions by ﬂight/oversight, mean problem activity, mean can
lifetime, etc.
Garbage Can in the Lab 215APPENDIX C: COMPUTER CODE FOR THE
DOWNSCALED GCM FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Organization.java
import java.io.BufferedWriter;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileWriter;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.Random;
public class Organization{
// Fixed parameters
staticfinalintnumParticipants=4,numDecisions=8,numProblems= 16;
static final int energyPar = 3, energyPro = 10;
static final int endTime = 10;
// Variable parameters
public int accessStructure; // (0) unsegmented, (1) hierarchic, (2)
specialized
public int decisionStructure; // (0) unsegmented, (1) hierarchic, (2)
specialized
// Agents
public ArrayListoDecisionW decisions;
public ArrayListoParticipantW participants;
public ArrayListoProblemW problems;
// Statistics
public int numResolution = 0;
public int numOversightFlight = 0;
public int problemLatency = 0; // Periods of being latent in the
organization
public int problemActivity = 0; // Periods of attaching to a
decision
public int participantActivity = 0; // Number of flights of
participants
public int decisionDifficulty = 0; // Active time within the
organization
// Others
public int time = 0;
public Random rand;
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// Model Parameters
accessStructure = accessStr;
decisionStructure = decisionStr;
rand = random;
// Lists of agents
decisions = new ArrayListoDecisionW();
participants = new ArrayListoParticipantW();
problems = new ArrayListoProblemW();
// Participants in the organization
for(int i=1; io=numParticipants; i++) addParticipant
(i, energyPar);
}
/** Model procedure **/
public void proceed(){
time ++;
// Fly of participants searching for better decision opportunity
for(int index=participants.size()-1; indexW=0; index--){
Participant aParticipant = participants.get(index);
aParticipant.search();
}
// Fly of problems searching for better decision opportunity
for(int index=problems.size()-1; indexW=0; index--){
Problem aProblem = problems.get(index);
aProblem.search();
}
// Decision-making process
for(int index=decisions.size()-1; indexW=0; index--){
Decision aDecision = decisions.get(index);
aDecision.proceed();
}
}
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public void addDecision(int importance){
Decision aDecision = new Decision (this, importance);
decisions.add(aDecision);
}
public void addParticipant(int importance, double energy){
Participant aParticipant = new Participant(this,
importance, energy);
participants.add(aParticipant);
}
public void addProblem(int importance, double energy){
Problem aProblem = new Problem(this, importance, energy);
problems.add(aProblem);
}
/** Simulation Experiment: Given Entry Sequence **/
public static void main (String[] args) {
// Write results to the file
File file = new File("GCM_experiment - given sequence
(10 periods).txt");
try{
BufferedWriter writer = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(file,
false));
Random rand = new Random(System.currentTimeMillis());
writer.write("run"+"\t"+"structureA"+"\t"+"structureD"+"
\t"+"energyPro"+"\t"+"solvedProblems"+"\t"+"madeDecisions"+
"\t"+"resolutionRate" +"\t"+"proLatency"+"\t"+"proActivity"+
"\t"+"parActivity"+"\t"+"decDifficulty"); writer.newLine();
// Simulation runs
for(int run=1; runo=160; run++){
// Given entry sequence
int[] sequenceDec = {3,5,8,2,4,6,1,7};
int[] sequencePro = {6,4,5,12,14,2,13,10,1,3,9,11,8,16,7,15};
/** Variable model parameters **/
for(int as=0; aso3; as++){ // Access structure
for(int ds=0; dso3; ds++){ // Decision structure
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// Create an organization
Organization org = new Organization(as, ds, rand);
System.out.println("["+run+"] structureA = "+as+", structureD =
"+ds+", energyPro = "+ep);
// Model procedure
while(org.time o endTime){
// In-stream of decisions and problems
if(org.time o numDecisions){
// Entry of one decision
org.addDecision(sequenceDec[org.time]);
// Entry of two problems (mapping id to importance)
org.addProblem((sequencePro[2*org.time]+1)/2, ep);
org.addProblem((sequencePro[2*org.time+1]+1)/2, ep);
}
// GCM decision-making process
org.proceed();
}
// Write results to the file
writer.write(run+"\t"+as+"\t"+ds+"\t"+ep
+"\t"+(numProblems - org.problems.size())
+"\t"+(numDecisions - org.decisions.size())
+"\t"+(double)org.numResolution/(numDecisions -
org.decisions.size())
+"\t"+(double)org.problemLatency/numProblems
+"\t"+(double)org.problemActivity/numProblems
+"\t"+(double)org.participantActivity/numParticipants
+"\t"+(double)org.decisionDifficulty/numDecisions);
writer.newLine();
}
}
}
writer.flush();
}
writer.close();
}catch(IOException ex){
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use.");
ex.printStackTrace();
}
System.out.println("Simulation done.");
}
}
Decision.java
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
public class Decision{
public Organization org;
public int importance;
public ArrayListoParticipantW participants;
public ArrayListoProblemW problems;
public double energyDeficit; // Current energy deficit
public double cumulativeEnergy; // Accumulated energy so far
public Decision(Organization p_org, int p_importance){
org = p_org;
importance = p_importance;
energyDeficit = 0;
cumulativeEnergy = 0;
participants = new ArrayListoParticipantW();
problems = new ArrayListoProblemW();
}
/** Behave as a decision opportunity **/
public void proceed(){
// Update statistics (periods of staying in the organization)
org.decisionDifficulty++;
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updateState();
// Attempt to make a decision (no decision without any contribution)
if(cumulativeEnergy > 0 && energyDeficit o= 0) makeDecision();
}/** Update energy states **/
public void updateState(){
// Update accumulated energy
IteratoroParticipantW itPar = participants.iterator();
while(itPar.hasNext()) cumulativeEnergy += itPar.next().energy;
// Update energy deficit
energyDeficit = -cumulativeEnergy;
IteratoroProblemW itPro = problems.iterator();
while(itPro.hasNext()) energyDeficit += itPro.next().energy;
}
/** Decision making **/
public void makeDecision(){
// Update statistics
if(problems.isEmpty()) org.numOversightFlight++; // No problem so
far, or all flew
out
else org.numResolution++; // With problem(s) resolved
// Release participants
IteratoroParticipantW itPar = participants.iterator();
while(itPar.hasNext()){
Participant aParticipant = itPar.next();
aParticipant.latent = true;
aParticipant.decision = null;
}
// Release problems
IteratoroProblemW itPro = problems.iterator();
while(itPro.hasNext()){
Problem aProblem = itPro.next();
aProblem.latent = true;
aProblem.decision = null;
org.problems.remove(aProblem);
}
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org.decisions.remove(this);
}
}
Participant.java
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
public class Participant{
static final int UNSEGMENTED = 0, HIERARCHIC = 1, SPECIALIZED = 2;
public int importance; // The smaller, the more important
public double energy; // Available energy
public boolean latent; // Whether attaching to a decision
opportunity
public Decision decision; // Current decision opportunity where
participating
public Organization org; // Organization
public Participant(Organization p_org, int p_importance, double
p_energy){
org = p_org;
importance = p_importance;
energy = p_energy;
latent = true;
decision = null;
}
/** Find and Go for a more attractive decision opportunity **/
public void search(){
// Identify accessible decision opportunities
ArrayListoDecisionW accessibleDecisions = new ArrayList
oDecisionW();
Decision aDecision;
IteratoroDecisionW it = org.decisions.iterator();
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aDecision = it.next();
if((org.decisionStructure == UNSEGMENTED) ||
(org.decisionStructure == HIERARCHIC && aDecision.
importance W= this.importance) ||
(org.decisionStructure == SPECIALIZED && aDecision.
importance == this.importance)){
accessibleDecisions.add(aDecision);
}
}
// If no accessible decision, stay latent
if(accessibleDecisions.isEmpty()){
latent = true;
decision = null;
}
// If only one accessible decision, fly to it
else if(accessibleDecisions.size() == 1){
flyTo(accessibleDecisions.get(0));
}
// Otherwise, identify and fly to the most attractive one
else{
// Exclude current contribution for fair comparison
if(!latent) decision.energyDeficit += energy;
// Identify the decision with least energy deficit
ArrayListoDecisionW targets = new ArrayListoDecisionW();
it = accessibleDecisions.iterator();
Decision best = it.next();
targets.add(best);
while(it.hasNext()){
aDecision = it.next();
if(aDecision.energyDeficit o best.energyDeficit){
best = aDecision;
targets.clear();
targets.add(aDecision);
}
else if(aDecision.energyDeficit == best.energyDeficit){
targets.add(aDecision);
}
}
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if(!latent) decision.energyDeficit -= energy;
// Fly to the chosen decision (it could be the current one)
flyTo(targets.get(org.rand.nextInt(targets.size())));
}
}/** Fly to the (new) decision opportunity **/
public void flyTo(Decision newDecision){
// If it’s the current one, just stay there.
if(!latent && (decision == newDecision)) return;
// Move to the new decision opportunity
newDecision.participants.add(this);
if(!latent) decision.participants.remove(this);
// Update status
decision = newDecision;
latent = false;
// Count the number of flies(activities)
org.participantActivity++;
}
}
Problem.java
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
public class Problem{
static final int UNSEGMENTED = 0, HIERARCHIC = 1, SPECIALIZED = 2;
public int importance; // The smaller, the more important
public double energy; // Required energy
public boolean latent; // Whether attaching to a decision
opportunity
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attached
public Organization org; // Organization
public Problem (Organization p_org, int p_id, double p_energy){
org = p_org;
importance = p_id;
energy = p_energy;
latent = true;
decision = null;
}
/** Find and go for a more attractive decision opportunity **/
public void search(){
// Identify accessible decision opportunities
ArrayListoDecisionW accessibleDecisions = new ArrayList
oDecisionW();
Decision aDecision;
IteratoroDecisionW it = org.decisions.iterator();
while(it.hasNext()){
aDecision = it.next();
if((org.accessStructure == UNSEGMENTED) ||
(org.accessStructure == HIERARCHIC && aDecision.importance
W= this.importance) ||
(org.accessStructure ==SPECIALIZED && aDecision.importance
== this.importance)){
accessibleDecisions.add(aDecision);
}
}
// If no accessible decision, stay latent
if(accessibleDecisions.isEmpty()){
latent = true;
decision = null;
org.problemLatency++;
}
// If only one accessible decision, fly to it
else if(accessibleDecisions.size() == 1){
flyTo(accessibleDecisions.get(0));
}
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else{
// Exclude current contribution for fair comparison
if(!latent) decision.energyDeficit -= energy;
// Identify the decision with least energy deficit
ArrayListoDecisionW targets = new ArrayListoDecisionW();
it = accessibleDecisions.iterator();
Decision best = it.next();
targets.add(best);
while(it.hasNext()){
aDecision = it.next();
if(aDecision.energyDeficit o best.energyDeficit){
best = aDecision;
targets.clear();
targets.add(aDecision);
}
else if(aDecision.energyDeficit == best.energyDeficit){
targets.add(aDecision);
}
}
// Turn it back to the original value
if(!latent) decision.energyDeficit += energy;
// Fly to the chosen decision (it could be the current one)
flyTo(targets.get(org.rand.nextInt(targets.size())));
}
}
/** Fly to the (new) decision opportunity **/
public void flyTo(Decision newDecision){
// Update model statistics
org.problemActivity++;
// If it’s the current one, just stay there.
if(!latent && (decision == newDecision)) return;
// Move to the new decision opportunity
newDecision.problems.add(this);
if(!latent) decision.problems.remove(this);
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decision = newDecision;
latent = false;
}
}
